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Abstract    
The thesis pinpoints the responsibility of external powers in the tragic course of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, as well as their influence on the policy making its leaders, from 1997 to 2001. 
It points out that, given the country’s geostrategic position in the heart of Africa and its immense 
natural resources, foreign governments play the preeminent role in the shaping of its destiny, 
particularly during the abovementioned five-year period marked by the two Congo Wars. 
This role had been blunt in the demise of Mobutu’s 32 year-long reckless, kleptocratic regime, as a 
consequence of the shift, by the United States of America aiming to safeguard its hegemonic 
interests in Central Africa, of the strategically pivotal pawn from Zaire to Uganda in the aftermath 
of the end of the Cold War. Thus, craving a great influence in the continent and sponsored by 
multinational companies from North America, Belgium, Australia and South Africa, Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni, along with his ex-subordinate Rwandan Deputy President Paul 
Kagame, patronized in October 1996 the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo (AFDL), a Congolese rebel group led by Laurent Kabila and committed to oust Field 
Marshal Mobutu who bit the dust on 17 May 1997. 
The superseding AFDL reign will be mainly featured by the takeover of key positions of the state 
authority by Rwandans and Ugandans (keeping President Kabila in the thrall of his two eastern 
mentors), the throttling of the democratic process, the conditioning by major powers of any 
funding of Kinshasa’s triennial development programme to the Kabila regime’s observance of 
democracy, human rights and a UN investigation of the mass killing of Hutu Rwandese refugees 
on the DRC’s soil. That international community’s stance infuriated the Congolese leader who 
reconsidered all mining contracts signed with multinationals, developing anti-West discourse, 
promoted South-South cooperation, and expressed Rwandans and Ugandans from the Congo. 
The Western-backed Rwanda and Uganda bounced back by undertaking a military toppling of 
Laurent Kabila; but they reaped a fiasco because of three factors: intervention of Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan siding with Kinshasa; dissention within the Congolese Rally 
for Democracy (RCD); and tension between Kigali and Kampala that initiated the creation of a 
new rebel group: the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The stalemate brought about 
by this situation and the involvement of the UN, the OAU, the SADC, the US, France and Belgium 
compelled the warring parties to conclude the Lusaka Agreement, setting up a roadmap for the war 
end, the inter-Congolese dialogue, a new transitional government, and an electoral process toward 
the democratic rebirth in the DRC. However, the Lusaka Agreement will be implemented thanks to 
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the rise of Major General Joseph Kabila, after the assassination of his phantasmagoric father 
Laurent Kabila, paving the way to the Third Republic. 
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ACRONYMS 
 
 
ACC                 Anglo-American Corporation  
AFD                 Alliance of Democratic Forces 
AFDL               Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
AGOA             African Growth and Opportunities Act 
AGI                 Accord Global et Inclusif 
AU                   African Union  
BGC                Barrick Gold Corporation 
CENCO           National Conference Episcopal of the DR Congo 
CIAT                International Committee in Support of the Transition 
CNR                 Conseil National de Resistance 
CNS                 Sovereign National Conference  
DDRR              Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, and Reintegration  
DDR                 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DRC                 Democratic Republic of Congo 
EU                    European Union 
FAC                 Congolese Armed Forces 
FARDC           Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
FAZ        Zairian Armed Forces 
FDLR               Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
FNL                  National Forces of Liberation 
GSSP               Special Presidential Security Guard   
HCR-PT          High Council of Republic-Parliament of Transition 
ICD                  Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
ICG                  International Crisis Group  
IEC                   Independent Electoral Commission 
IPC                   Ituri Pacification Committee 
JMC                 Joint Military Commission  
LRA                  Lord’s Resistance Army 
MLC                 Movement for the Liberation of the Congo 
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MPR                  Popular Movement of the Revolution 
MONUC          United Nations Organisation Mission in Congo 
OAU                Organisation of African Unity 
OCHA             Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
PACMT           Political Agreement for Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC  
RCD-Goma     Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma 
RCD-ML         Congolese Rally for Democracy- Liberation Movement 
RCD-N            Congolese Rally for Democracy-National 
 SADC             Southern African Development Community 
SPLA               Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
UDPS              Union for Democracy and Social Progress 
UNITA            National union for the total independence of Angola 
UPC                 Union of the Congolese People 
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